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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
 
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
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Introduction 
 
On December 20, 2013, the reforms to the Mexican Constitution permitting the 
investment of private capital in the hydrocarbons and electrical industries for the first time 
in 75 years were published.1 The secondary laws that were approved by Congress 
established the possibility of an arbitration clause being included in contracts related to 
energy projects. Arbitration of conflicts arising from energy contracts would open up many 
possibilities for private investors, although it would also present public policy concerns.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze both the scope and limits of arbitration as a means 
for resolving disputes related to energy contracts in Mexico, as well as the protection that 
foreign investors may receive when entering into this type of contract. Considering that 
the Mexican state has in the past violated the investment protection standards contained in 
treaties to which it is a party, whether or not foreign investors will be able to resort to 
investment arbitration—despite existing legal limitations—will be of particular importance.  
 
With this in view, the first section describes and analyzes the constitutional and legal rules 
that allow for arbitration within the context of the new legal framework governing 
hydrocarbons and electricity in Mexico. The second section examines recent energy 
arbitration proceedings that, although occurring outside the context of the reform, have 
large implications for the same. It focuses on the case of COMMISA v. PEMEX,2 which 
involved both the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice and United States district courts. 
Finally, the third section will address the question of whether—given the limitations of the 
reform—investment arbitration would still be possible in the case of breaches of 
investment protection standards contained in treaties signed by Mexico. This last analysis 
is based on an investment arbitration case that has not yet been finalized as of the date of 
writing this paper: KBR v. Mexico,3 which arose directly out of the COMMISA case.  
 
Arbitration Within the Scope of the Energy Reform 
 
Provisions in the 2013 constitutional reform transform the laws governing energy in 
Mexico that have essentially been in effect since the expropriation of the petroleum 
industry in 1938 during the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas. Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX) and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) cease to be state-owned industries, 
as Article 25 of the constitutional text establishes them under a new category: “productive 
state companies.” Neither the constitutional text nor the regulatory laws provide a 
definition of a productive state company. However, Article 4 of the PEMEX Law4 sheds 
some light, determining that such a company:  
performs corporate, economic, industrial, and commercial activities; generates 
economic value and profitability for its owner, the Mexican state; acts in a 
transparent, honest, and efficient manner based on fairness and social and 
environmental responsibility; and strives to improve productivity to maximize 
the state’s petroleum revenue and thereby contribute to national development. 
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Likewise, Articles 2 and 3 of the same law establish that PEMEX is the exclusive property of 
the federal government; however, it will be subject to the terms of its own law, and 
commercial and civil regulations will be applied on a suppletory basis. As we will see below, 
these regulatory definitions are important for determining when an activity of PEMEX (or 
of the CFE) is to be considered an administrative act, or an act subject to private law. The 
foregoing is relevant to determining whether a dispute can be subject to arbitration. 
 
Article 27 of the Constitution maintains the nation’s ownership of the hydrocarbons in the 
subsoil and expressly prohibits granting concessions for the exploration and extraction of 
hydrocarbons. It allows for these activities to be carried out through assignments to state 
organizations—or through contracts with state organizations or individuals in order to 
share risk, technology, and experience—and establishes that the nation’s ownership of the 
hydrocarbons must be affirmed in all assignments or contracts. In the case of the electrical 
sector, Article 27 states:  
The planning and control of the national electric system, as well as the public 
services of transmitting and distributing electric energy, are the exclusive domain 
of the nation; in these activities, no concessions will be granted, without prejudice 
to the state being able to enter into contracts with individuals pursuant to the 
terms established by the laws, which will determine the manner in which 
individuals will be able to participate in other activities of the electrical industry.5  
 
Again, the possibility of the state entering into contracts with individuals is stated in the 
actual constitutional text. Finally, Article 28 of the Constitution establishes that the 
exploration and extraction of oil and gas, as well as the public services of transmitting and 
distributing electric energy, are “strategic activities”—i.e., activities that are exclusively 
carried out by the state, although this does not constitute a monopoly. Within this context, 
reference is made to activities in which the state is clearly executing “governmental 
actions” and which would therefore not be arbitrable, on principle. 
 
However, the new laws governing both PEMEX and the CFE establish more specific criteria 
regarding the possibility of arbitrating potential disputes arising from contracts, as referred 
to in the constitutional articles.6 It is important to mention that prior to the energy 
reform—specifically since 2009—arbitration has been available for all government 
procurement contracts at a federal level, pursuant to the terms of the Public Works and 
Related Services Act as well as the Public Sector Procurement, Lease, and Services Act.7 
According to this legal framework, arbitration is not permitted in cases of rescission or 
early termination.8 Likewise, Article 139 of the Public-Private Partnerships Act9 establishes 
that arbitration does not apply to the cancellation of concessions and authorizations in 
general, or to any acts of authority. Likewise, exclusive jurisdiction is granted to the federal 
courts for the resolution of disputes related to the legal validity of any government act.  
 
As indicated earlier, the PEMEX Law establishes that the relevant contracts are governed by 
said law, and by the provisions of civil and commercial legislation in a suppletory manner. 
In turn, Article 80 of this law states that all acts that are carried out within the contracting 
procedure, up to and including the award, will be considered a government act. However, 
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as soon as the contract has been signed, it and all subsequent contracts are private in nature 
and governed by the applicable commercial or private legislation. 
 
Thus far, this point remains clear: the legislation is explicit in terms of the commercial 
nature of contracts with PEMEX, and therefore leaves the door open to arbitration for 
resolving disputes by not referring to exceptions in cases of administrative rescission or 
early termination. As a matter of fact, Article 81 of the current PEMEX Law establishes that 
as soon as a contract has been awarded and signed, all subsequent disputes will be within 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, except when an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism has been agreed upon.  
 
Subsequently, Article 115 states that PEMEX and its subsidiaries are authorized to agree to 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, arbitral clauses, or commitments pursuant to 
the terms stipulated in applicable commercial legislation and relevant international treaties 
signed by Mexico. It goes further by providing that in the case of legal acts or contracts that 
either have effects or are carried out outside of the nation, PEMEX and its subsidiaries are 
authorized to agree to the application of foreign law, to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts regarding commercial issues, and to sign arbitral agreements whenever 
suitable to best achieve their purpose. Within this last context, it remains very clear that in 
the case of a dispute that has arisen out of a contract regulated by the PEMEX law, PEMEX 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal without recourse to sovereign 
immunity as a defense, which it had previously used in cases litigated in the United States.10 
Of course, it can also enter into contracts governed by foreign law and be subject—in 
principle—to arbitration in any agreed-upon location. These provisions do not contain any 
exception for arbitrability ratione materiae.  
 
In a similar manner, the CFE Law establishes that bidding procedures prior to the awarding 
of a contract are administrative in nature, although Article 82 makes it clear that as soon as 
the contract has been signed, all resulting acts are of a commercial nature. The distinction 
that both the PEMEX and CFE laws make between acta jure gestionis (acts of a commercial 
nature), rather than acta jure imperii (acts of public authority) with respect to contracts based 
on these frameworks constitutes a very significant change related to the circumstances that 
gave rise to the COMMISA dispute, which will be discussed below. 
 
In spite of the foregoing, the new Hydrocarbons Act11 does maintain the government 
contracting process, insofar as early termination and rescission related to oil and gas 
exploration and extraction is concerned. In fact, Articles 22 and 97 emphasize the 
commercial nature of the actions of the hydrocarbons industry. Article 97 establishes that 
“in any matters not set forth by this law, the acts of the hydrocarbons industry are 
considered to be commercial acts, and they will therefore be governed by the Commercial 
Code and, in a suppletory manner, by the provisions of the Federal Civil Code.”  
 
Obviously, the nature of the law is one of public utility, considering that it regulates a 
sector that is deemed strategic by the Constitution. Within this context, whenever a 
government contract is rescinded by the government (generally known as “administrative 
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rescission”), this action can only be challenged through arbitration before a Mexican 
administrative tribunal. In this context, Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Act establishes that 
the federal executive branch, by means of the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH), 
may proceed with administrative rescission of contracts for exploration and extraction and 
recover the contractual area only in the event of any of the serious causes that the 
provision lists. Regardless of these causes, within the contract itself it is possible to agree on 
causes for rescission and early termination respectively. Under these circumstances, the 
contractor is entitled to challenge the administrative rescission before the CNH itself, 
claiming what it is entitled to by law. The same article establishes that as a consequence of 
administrative rescission, the contractor will transfer the contractual area to the state 
without any charge, payment, or indemnity whatsoever. According to Article 4, Section III, 
of the same law, “contractual area” refers to:  
The surface and depth determined by the Ministry of Energy as well as the 
geological formations contained in the vertical projection on said surface for said 
depth, where the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons is carried out based 
on the signing of contracts for exploration and extraction. 
 
According to the foregoing section, Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Act establishes that 
within exploration and extraction contracts, it is possible to establish alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms to solve controversies arising from the contracts themselves, 
including arbitration agreements pursuant to the terms set forth in the Commercial Code 
and in international treaties dealing with matters of arbitration and dispute resolution to 
which Mexico is a party—except in cases of administrative rescission, which has already 
been discussed. Unlike PEMEX and the CFE, neither the CNH nor any contractors are 
entitled to subject themselves to foreign laws. Therefore, within the scope of arbitration 
proceedings, the applicable law must be Mexican federal laws.  
 
The contract model for the so-called “Round One” of PEMEX’s bidding rounds establishes 
a substantial difference in its dispute resolution clauses by emphasizing that all disputes 
that arise from or are related to the legal grounds for administrative rescission or any act of 
authority must be resolved exclusively in Mexico’s federal courts. The foregoing 
notwithstanding, any other dispute that cannot be resolved through a conciliation 
procedure after three months must be submitted to arbitration, in accordance with the 
Regulations of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. The authority 
in charge of designating the arbitral procedure shall be the secretary general of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, where the arbitration will be held.12   
 
As shown by these rules, the August 2014 laws have introduced a fundamental change by 
abandoning the administrative contract—which had been governed by administrative 
law13—with the exception of the stipulations contained in the Hydrocarbons Act related to 
oil and gas exploration and extraction contracts.14 The administrative contract had 
formerly been very significant in Mexico’s arbitration experience in energy matters—
specifically in the COMMISA case, which will be discussed in the following section of this 
paper. It is important to mention that the reform did not effect any change on issues of 
arbitrability in the Public Works and Related Services Act; the Public Sector Procurement, 
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Lease, and Services Act; or the Public-Private Partnerships Act (APP).15 In these cases, 
administrative rescission, early termination, and—in the case of the APP—any act of 
authority under the applicable administrative law continue to be non-arbitrable.  
 
Because of the partial upholding of administrative rescission, Mexico’s experience in the 
COMMISA case is outlined below, where this was a central issue. 
 
COMMISA v. PEMEX   
 
Until the COMMISA case, the inarbitrability of administrative rescission was a latent risk; 
in arbitration practice, its status as an act of jure gestionis—and therefore subject to 
arbitration—prevailed.16 For some scholars, this case illustrates the problematic use of 
administrative rescission as a legal concept in French contract law. According to French 
law, the state has exorbitant powers over public contracting in areas such as the 
modification of contracts, and rescission and unilateral termination without a previous 
judicial procedure. Administrative rescission is considered an act of authority—or jure 
imperii—and can only be repealed by an administrative or constitutional trial through 
amparo proceedings. Therefore, according to French doctrine, an administrative contract 
cannot be subject to arbitration.17 
 
The distinction between acts of jure imperii and of jure gestionis is not only important to 
determine the arbitrability of a dispute involving the state. It is important to emphasize 
that this distinction is also relevant in determining when a tribunal may assert jurisdiction 
over a dispute in which one of the parties is a state. In the United States, this is governed 
according to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),18 which determined that a U.S. 
court will not assert jurisdiction over a dispute in which one of the parties is a state, or a 
government entity of a state, unless it performed a commercial action that demonstrates 
that it acted as a private entity (an act of jure gestionis) and did not engage in an act of 
authority (jure imperii). 
 
The foregoing is relevant because PEMEX has been involved in disputes in the United 
States and, depending on the nature of the activity being disputed, has been considered to 
be a part of the Mexican state under FSIA. During the legal case “In the Matter of SEDCO 
Inc.,”19 which concerns the damage caused by the explosion of the Ixtoc I well in the Bay of 
Campeche in 1979, PEMEX successfully claimed before a federal judge in Texas that it 
enjoyed sovereign immunity and the dispute could not therefore be tried in the United 
States. The federal judge concluded that the exploration and extraction activity that was 
carried out was exclusively an activity of the Mexican state and, therefore, an act of jure 
imperii. As a result, in this specific case PEMEX was not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, since it 
enjoyed sovereign immunity. 
 
The French doctrine of inarbitrability has one important difference with respect to those 
of Mexico and other Latin American countries. According to French law, any modification 
of the contractual balance—such as its rescission or termination—requires the payment of 
an indemnity. The amount of this indemnity includes, as a basic rule, the losses that have 
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been incurred (damnum emergens) and damages awarded for the loss of reasonably expected 
profits (lucrum cessans), subject to proper justification.20 In the case of Mexico, this 
obligation to indemnify only exists when so-called unrecoverable expenses, or “sunk costs,” 
are claimed.21 For some authors, this situation—combined with the inherent inarbitrability 
of acts of jure imperii—creates considerable political risk, as it might result in arbitration 
between an investor and the state.22 This issue will be addressed in the following section. 
However, it is necessary to analyze the circumstances that gave rise to the COMMISA case 
and examine which of those regarding the inarbitrability of administrative rescission 
continue to apply within the context of the energy reform.  
  
In October 1997, the Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. 
(COMMISA) and PEMEX Exploration and Production entered into a contract based on unit 
rates and a fixed term for the construction of and services related to two oil platforms in 
the Bay of Campeche.23 As a result of alleged noncompliance by the contractor, and after 
two unsuccessful conciliation attempts, PEMEX administratively and unilaterally 
terminated the aforementioned contract and applied contractual penalties. In December 
2004, COMMISA initiated arbitral proceedings before the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and concurrently filed an amparo action that sought to cancel the 
administrative rescission and the drawdown of bonds in the amount of the contractual 
penalties.24 Therefore, COMMISA’s legal strategy was to fight on two fronts: first, in the 
form of the means of arbitration agreed upon in the contract, and second, through an 
amparo lawsuit. 
 
Here, it is important to point out that in order to file an amparo lawsuit in Mexico, it must 
be established that an act of authority violated constitutional rights. By virtue thereof, 
COMMISA had to argue that PEMEX was carrying out an act of jure imperii and not of jure 
gestionis. The foregoing notwithstanding, in August 2005 the Fourteenth District Court for 
Administrative Matters ruled to dismiss the lawsuit, since the challenged rescission was not 
considered an act of authority.25 
 
Considering the circumstances that afterward materialized for the contractor, it appeared 
that COMMISA had to comply with this resolution. However, COMMISA decided to file an 
appeal for review with the Sixth Court of Appeals for Administrative Matters, which 
ultimately determined that an act of authority existed. Considering the relevance of the 
issue, Mexico’s Supreme Court exercised its power to assume jurisdiction and, in a 
resolution dated June 2006, ruled that the state’s exercise of its power to unilaterally 
rescind an administrative contract was constitutional.26 Based on this ruling, COMMISA 
was not only unable to overturn the challenged administrative rescission, but the Court 
also implicitly ruled regarding the inarbitrability of the administrative rescission itself, by 
deeming it an act of jure imperii.27 Even though the Court did not expressly state this— since 
its ruling was limited to the constitutionality of the state’s power to rescind a contract 
without a prior trial—it did establish the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court judge to 
rule on the rescission within the scope of an ordinary administrative trial. In summary, the 
Court’s ruling in the COMMISA case led to the express exception to arbitrability under 
federal laws in matters of public works and acquisitions, as well as those related to the 
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APP.28 Within this context, the only option available to a contractor for asserting claims 
once an administrative rescission has been carried out is an ordinary administrative trial, 
which apparently leaves the arbitration clause without any practical effect.  
 
It is necessary to emphasize that while the jurisdictional proceedings initiated by 
COMMISA were underway—from the District Court to the Supreme Court—the arbitral 
tribunal had already exercised its full jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the ICC 
Tribunal maintained that it had jurisdiction regarding all issues related to the dispute and 
rejected a motion filed by PEMEX arguing that the tribunal could not hear the issue based 
on res judicata. In October 2007, PEMEX filed a second motion arguing once again that the 
principle of res judicata made the decision lack merit; that COMMISA had actually waived 
its right to arbitration by filing an amparo action; and that administrative rescission 
constituted an act of authority that could not be submitted to arbitration, since this matter 
was inarbitrable. However, the arbitral tribunal disagreed with these points and reaffirmed 
its original decision. 29 
 
While arbitration was pending, two relevant laws underwent significant reforms. The first 
was the Organic Law of the Federal Court of Fiscal and Administrative Justice,30 which in 
Article 14, Section VII, establishes that the aforementioned Court has jurisdiction in matters 
of resolutions “that are adopted in administrative matters regarding the interpretation of 
and compliance with contracts of public works, procurement, leases, and services that are 
entered into by the agencies and entities of the federal public administration.” The second 
law was the Public Works and Related Services Act, which in Article 98 establishes that, as 
of 2009, “arbitration will not apply to administrative rescission, early termination of 
contracts, as well as those cases set forth in the regulation of this law.” As will be shown 
below, this last rule was decisive in the process of the recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitral award pursued by COMMISA in the United States.  
 
Within this context, the arbitral procedure continued, and the tribunal rendered its verdict 
in December 2009. In addition to reaffirming its jurisdiction, the tribunal maintained that 
the principle of res judicata was not an impediment to COMMISA’s claim, and that Article 
98 of the Public Works and Related Services Act did not apply in this case, because the 
PEMEX Law expressly authorized the company to agree to arbitral clauses within its 
contracts. Therefore, the tribunal ruled in favor of COMMISA with regard to the majority 
of its claims and awarded monetary compensation.31  
 
In January 2010, COMMISA filed an action for the recognition and enforcement of this 
arbitral award before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. It was 
found by the court to have merit in November 2010, and PEMEX subsequently filed an 
appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.   
 
Simultaneously, in January 2010 PEMEX filed for the nullification of the arbitral award 
before a district court in the Mexican state of Nuevo León. PEMEX argued that the dispute 
was not subject to arbitration as set forth in Article 1475 of the Commercial Code, and that 
the award violated notions of public order. The court rejected the nullification suit on the 
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grounds that PEMEX had to proceed with the suit in the place where the arbitration had 
occurred—i.e., Mexico City. PEMEX once again filed a suit with the Fifth District Court in 
Mexico City, which was also rejected based on partially substantive criteria. The judge 
ruled that PEMEX had validated the arbitrability of the issue by failing to file an objection 
in a timely manner to the preliminary award, in which the arbitral tribunal declared that it 
had jurisdiction, as permitted by Article 1432 of the Commercial Code. Likewise, the judge 
ruled that the award did not violate notions of public order since it only involved 
individual interests resulting from a commercial relationship between the parties. PEMEX 
challenged this decision before the Eleventh Court of Appeals of the Federal District. In 
August 2011, this tribunal ruled that arbitration was designed to settle disputes between 
individuals, although administrative rescissions exist for the purpose of safeguarding the 
state’s financial resources; by virtue of this, there were indeed issues of public order at play. 
The tribunal referred to Article 98 of the Public Works and Related Services Act as the 
guiding principle to strengthen the arguments for public order being involved, though it 
denied that this rule was applied retroactively.32 
 
The second legal source upon which the Appeals Court based its ruling was a decision of 
the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.33 This decision was not related to arbitral 
proceedings, although it maintained that administrative rescissions were acts of authority; 
rather, by virtue of the fact that acts of authority are not subject to arbitration, the arbitral 
tribunal that heard the dispute between COMMISA and PEMEX did not have jurisdiction 
to do so. It is necessary to remember that the Supreme Court, when exercising its power of 
assuming jurisdiction regarding COMMISA’s amparo suit in 2006, established that 
COMMISA should have challenged PEMEX’s administrative rescission before a federal 
court that had jurisdiction over administrative matters. The Appeals Court also agreed with 
this ruling and, based on this, ordered that the award be nullified. 
 
COMMISA filed a suit seeking damages before the Federal Court of Fiscal and 
Administrative Justice (the exclusive forum for disputes concerning administrative 
rescissions, according to Article 98 of the Public Works and Related Services Act, which is 
currently in effect) in November 2012, although this tribunal rejected the suit by ruling that 
the deadline for filing had already passed.34 It is important to point out that PEMEX filed 
other suits after the nullification of the award in order to draw down the bond that 
COMMISA had posted in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the contract, but an in-
depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
What must be highlighted is the suit filed by COMMISA in the United States for the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award against PEMEX in that country. First 
and foremost, COMMISA had to prove that there were no grounds to reject the jurisdiction 
of the U.S. court based on a lack of “personal jurisdiction”—i.e., minimum contact of 
PEMEX with the United States. Likewise, it had to prove that there were no grounds to rule 
that that forum did not have the jurisdiction for recognition and enforcement (forum non 
conveniens). Therefore, on August 27, 2013, U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein handed 
down a ruling confirming the arbitral award, thereby rejecting PEMEX’s petition to dismiss 
COMMISA’s suit.35 It is interesting to note that three days after the ruling was handed 
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down, KBR Inc., COMMISA’s parent company, filed a notice of investment arbitration in 
accordance with Chapter XI of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).36 
Based on its status as a foreign investor, KBR complained in this suit that the Mexican 
government had not complied with its obligations to accord it “fair and equitable 
treatment” as provided by the terms of the treaty, which is an issue that will be analyzed in 
detail in the following section of this paper.  
 
The procedure for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award merits a separate 
analysis. However, a brief reference to the grounds for the judge’s confirmation of the award 
provides us with an idea of the consequences that arbitration may have within the context of 
the energy reform, even when carried out in Mexico and where Mexican law is applicable.37   
 
Generally speaking, the U.S. District Court concluded that when COMMISA filed its claim 
against PEMEX, there was no law, precedent, or legal source that would have informed the 
company that it had to make its claim before a jurisdictional tribunal in lieu of going through 
arbitration. This conclusion is interesting, because the judge seems to assign no importance 
to the fact that COMMISA initiated the arbitral procedure and simultaneously filed an 
amparo motion to challenge the administrative rescission. Within this context, it would seem 
that COMMISA knew that it had recourse to avenues other than arbitration. As a matter of 
fact, it can be concluded that opting for parallel litigation had very negative consequences for 
COMMISA, considering that it motivated the Mexican Supreme Court to determine that 
administrative rescission was actually an act of authority and not subject to arbitration. 
 
On the other hand, the district court judge concluded that in this case, COMMISA had a 
reasonable belief that it was entitled to arbitration by virtue of the arbitration clause in the 
contract. Here, it is worth pointing out that although it might have seemed like a tactical 
error on COMMISA’s part to have initiated parallel litigation, it is relevant that determining 
administrative rescission not being subject to arbitration actually renders inoperable any 
arbitration clause stipulated pursuant to the terms of the contract between PEMEX and 
COMMISA, considering that the only alternative would be to challenge the rescission 
before the Federal Court of Fiscal and Administrative Justice.  
 
The U.S. judge emphatically concluded that the decision of the Mexican court to set aside 
the arbitral award violated basic notions of justice in applying a law and a public policy that 
were not in effect when the parties signed the relevant contract.38 Therefore, according to 
the judge, COMMISA was being denied an opportunity to be heard on the underlying 
matter—i.e., the substantive part of the dispute. The judge specifically referred to Article 98 
of the Public Works and Related Services Act, which, as we have stated, was not in effect at 
the time of the signing of the contract. Likewise, he accorded fundamental importance to 
principles of U.S. public policy, but not to principles of Mexican “public order.” However, 
determining whether issues of public order in the place of enforcement of a court ruling 
should be weighted more than those of the location where the award was rendered (in 
accordance with the law with regard to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
award) warrants a more thorough analysis that certainly exceeds the purposes of this paper. 
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Finally, and very significantly, the U.S. judge concluded that applying any principle of 
deference to the Mexican court decision was incorrect, considering that the language of the 
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama 
Convention) indicates that it is within a judge’s power not to recognize and enforce an 
arbitral award that has been declared void in its country of origin, though it is not 
obligatory. Therefore, as already stated, Judge Hellerstein was granting priority to 
principles of public policy over the recognized principle of international comity.39  
 
In summary, the COMMISA case is a clear example of the complexities that can result 
from an arbitration proceeding of this nature. Precisely because it concerns the energy 
sector, this case spawns considerations of public relevance and state interests that certainly 
exceed the criteria that apply to very complex arbitrations in other fields. As indicated by 
some commentators on this case, “By converting, during an administrative or 
constitutional trial, the act of jure gestionis of administrative rescission to a true act of 
authority of jure imperii, arbitrability ratione materiae is eliminated.”40 At the end of the day, 
COMMISA’s right to submit the dispute to arbitration was violated, although the 
inarbitrability of administrative rescission was a latent risk based on the very existence of 
this legal concept in French administrative law, and particularly due to the fact that the 
company initiated parallel litigation through amparo proceedings.  
 
At the time of the preparation of this analysis, an appeal of the U.S. District Court ruling is 
pending. Attention must be paid to the resulting considerations. However, it is necessary to 
emphasize that—as has been said—the government contracting process has been abandoned 
for PEMEX and CFE contracts within the context of the 2013 energy reform, although it 
continues to be in effect in the case of oil and gas exploration and extraction contracts.  
 
In light of the foregoing information, it is now necessary to attempt to address how the issue 
of arbitrability in energy matters is dealt with in the case of foreign investment disputes. 
 
The Possibility of Investor versus State Arbitration in the Energy Sector 
 
According to Sornarajah, “Few areas of international law excite as much controversy as that 
related to foreign investment.”41 The already recognized international law of foreign 
investments is a fundamental part of international economic law. At the same time, analysis 
of the development of this disputed legal area has caused fields of study based on specific 
sectors to emerge. This is precisely the case of what Schill and others already categorize as 
“international energy investment law.”42 As a matter of fact, one of the most important 
agreements related to investment on an international level is the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT). The ECT reflects a regulatory perspective on investment relationships, placing them 
within a broader framework of economic, environmental, and social governance.43  
 
International foreign investment law includes, as a fundamental element, investment 
arbitration or investor versus state arbitration, which has evolved  over time from the 
ratification of the International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID) 
Convention (or Washington Convention) in 1966 44 to more modern free trade agreements 
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(such as NAFTA) and bilateral investment treaties that incorporate the possibility of using 
this mechanism, in the case that an investor deems that its investment has not been treated 
in accordance with the standards of protection that such international agreements provide. 
 
Investor protection focuses on what is known as “political risk.” Therefore, in addition to 
other principles and specific rules, the treaties generally contain rules related to 
expropriation and principles regarding national treatment and most favored nation status, 
as well as fair and equitable treatment (FET) and full protection and security. The principle 
of FET is perhaps the most vague and problematic of all and has given rise to perceived 
contradictory interpretations by different investment arbitration tribunals. Because it is of 
particular importance, it will be analyzed below.45 
 
Mexico has signed a sizable number of treaties related to this matter, known as Agreements 
for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (APRPIs), in addition to 
treaties that include chapters on investment.46 Within this context, it is obvious that since 
the energy reform provides for the possibility of private investment—both domestic and 
foreign—in an area that was formerly exclusively reserved for the state, foreign investors 
are protected by the disciplines contained in these treaties. A breach of these principles can 
give rise to the activation of the investment arbitration mechanism; therefore, a relevant 
question is whether it is possible that an arbitral tribunal in matters of investment can have 
jurisdiction—at the request of an investor—over a dispute related to foreign investment in 
the energy sector. 
 
As we have has seen in the first part of this paper, both the PEMEX and CFE laws consider 
arbitration as a mechanism for the resolution of disputes under the contracts they enter into. 
For example, Article 115 of the PEMEX Law establishes that this productive state-owned 
company and its subsidiary productive companies will be able to agree to alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms—or arbitration clauses—pursuant to the terms of the applicable 
commercial legislation and the international treaties to which Mexico is a party. As has been 
stated, these rules do not contain any exception of arbitrability ratione materiae.  
 
However, disputes that result in investment arbitration are generally not contractual 
disputes, unless that contract contains an arbitration clause that names the ICSID as the 
arbitration administrator in accordance with the Washington Convention. Here, it is 
necessary to remember that inexplicably, Mexico is not a member of this convention and 
only uses its so-called “Additional Facility” to administer investment disputes.47 Another 
possibility to dealing with an investment dispute that deals with broader substantive claims 
would be to include contractual disputes under an “umbrella clause” in the relevant 
investment treaty;48 analyzing such clauses goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
By virtue of the foregoing, it may seem that there is no obstacle to having investment 
arbitration available to foreign investors within the context of the energy reform. However, it 
is important to remember that the Hydrocarbons Act left the legal concept of administrative 
rescission intact; as a result, arbitration clauses can be included in oil and gas exploration and 
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extraction contracts, but any objection to rescission would not be subject to arbitration. As 
stated, arbitration related to exploration and extraction is governed by Mexican law.  
 
All of this notwithstanding, what would happen in a case like COMMISA’s—where it was 
alleged that the contractor was left without any defense—should be determined. Could 
investment arbitration be requested based on this argument (in addition to others)? It has 
already been stated that KBR, the parent company of COMMISA, filed a notice of 
investment arbitration against Mexico in August 2013. It would be interesting to examine 
this notice—and what has occurred in these proceedings, as of the date of publication of 
this paper—in an attempt to answer the questions formulated above. 
 
KBR filed the notice of arbitration alleging breaches of different provisions of Chapter XI 
of NAFTA as well as Article 1503 (2). The same notice contains issues that deserve a more 
exhaustive legal analysis; however, this paper is limited to issues regarding the jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
KBR demonstrated that it was an investor that had made an investment pursuant to the 
terms of Article 1139 of NAFTA, since COMMISA is a subsidiary owned by a foreign 
investor (a wholly owned subsidiary) that directly or indirectly controls the contract rights, 
which, according to the language of the treaty, represent intangible property acquired with 
the expectation of their use to obtain an economic benefit.49  
 
A more interesting approach would be to consider the ICC award as a protected 
investment.50 KBR based its argument on the opinion of two arbitral tribunals that ruled on 
similar situations. As a matter of fact, in the Mondev case,51 the tribunal concluded that 
NAFTA had to be interpreted in a broad manner to cover any legal claim that arises out of 
the treatment of an investment pursuant to the terms of Article 1139. In this respect, the 
ICC award was the result of an investment carried out by KBR in Mexico. On the other 
hand, the claimant quotes the decision regarding tribunal jurisdiction in the case of Saipem 
SpA,52 where the arbitrators concluded that the rights covered by an ICC award were not 
created through the award itself, but rather arose from the relevant contract. In the words 
of the tribunal, the ICC award crystallized the rights and obligations of the parties under 
the original contract in such a manner that determining whether the award can be deemed 
an investment remained an open question, since the contractual rights “crystallized” by the 
award represent an investment pursuant to the terms of the relevant investment 
agreement. This opinion in the Saipem case is interesting; however, the fact that the 
definition of “investment” is different in every treaty and that its interpretation may 
likewise vary must be taken into account. 
 
All this notwithstanding, the procedural point that has been disputed until now is related to 
the rules in Article 1121 of NAFTA, which requires that the claimant provide its express 
consent to submit to arbitration and waive:  
their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court 
under the law of any party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any 
proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing party that is alleged to be 
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a breach referred to in Article 1117, except for proceedings for injunctive, 
declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, 
before an administrative tribunal or court under the law of the disputing party.53 
 
KBR emphasized that within the context of the terms set forth in Article 1121, the 
proceedings it initiated in different forums that are related to the dispute do not involve 
any payment of damages, since they are enforcement proceedings—in this case, 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Therefore, KBR explicitly stated in its notice of 
arbitration that it did not waive its right to initiate proceedings for the recognition and 
enforcement of the final ICC award in any state that was a party to the New York or 
Panama Conventions. Likewise, it did not waive its right under the Panama Convention to 
continue with the existing proceedings before the U.S. District Court for recognition and 
enforcement of the award. It refused to waive its rights based on the judgment rendered by 
Judge Hellerstein or its right to continue with the existing proceedings within the scope of 
the New York Convention for the enforcement of the award in Luxembourg. On the other 
hand, KBR made a very clear distinction between the contractual dispute that gave rise to 
the arbitration and the one in which it claimed breaches of the investment protections 
contained in Chapter XI of NAFTA. Proceedings regarding recognition and enforcement 
cannot be resolved by measures that are considered to be in violation of international law.54 
 
In view of this apparent “forum shopping,” Mexico claimed that Article 1121 does apply to 
the procedures initiated by KBR. Mexico has emphatically argued that the proceedings in 
New York and Luxembourg are actually proceedings regarding damages. Therefore, 
because different courses of action exist in different forums, the risk of obtaining double 
indemnification is genuine and, therefore, the case regarding Chapter XI of NAFTA cannot 
proceed without a valid waiver filed in a timely manner by the claimant.55 In view of the 
claimant’s strategy to proceed simultaneously in different forums—curiously, the same 
thing that happened with COMMISA, which simultaneously initiated arbitration and 
amparo proceedings against the administrative rescission—Mexico has argued that “Chapter 
XI of NAFTA was not designed or intended to support the procedural strategy elected by 
the claimant.”56 
 
As already stated, the substantive part of KBR’s notice of arbitration affirms that Mexico 
breached different rules of Chapter XI as well as Article 1503 (2) of NAFTA, which obligates 
the parties to ensure that state-owned companies do not act in a manner that is 
incompatible with the disciplines set forth in Chapter XI. Moreover, KBR alleged that 
Mexico also breached Articles 1102 (national treatment), 1103 (most favored nation 
treatment), 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), and 1110 (expropriation and 
indemnification).57  
 
When KBR established the background, it emphasized a series of events that, from its point 
of view, was in violation of the principles of investment protection according to Chapter XI 
of NAFTA. Significantly, KBR referred to the ruling by the Eleventh Appeals Court, 
wherein it was concluded that the ICC arbitral tribunal could not interfere with PEMEX’s 
sovereign determination to proceed with administrative rescission of the contract. 
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According to KBR, the Appeals Court ruling was arbitrary, fundamentally unfair, 
inconsistent with Mexico’s international obligations, and irreconcilable with the rule of 
law.58 The language used by KBR suggests a possible emphasis on the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment contained in Article 1105 of NAFTA.59 Therefore, for the purposes of 
this analysis, it is very important to emphasize the following: regardless of the general 
arbitrability of any dispute arising from an energy project in Mexico, it is possible that 
there are facts related to the contractual relationship that, in the eyes of the investor, can be 
considered beyond a breach of contract, meaning that they become so complex that they 
may entail a presumed breach of international obligations. In particular, KBR’s language in 
its notice of arbitration makes it necessary to conduct a more thorough analysis of the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment and how this has been settled by investment 
tribunals in cases that have involved countries such as Argentina, and by virtue thereof, 
establish how these cases may serve Mexico in future disputes.60  
One fundamental element in the KBR case is the fact that Mexico did not make any claim 
of arbitrability ratione materiae. Even though the reasons may appear obvious from a 
strictly legal point of view, one must not forget the fact that under NAFTA and other 
investment treaties, all activities related to the hydrocarbons and electricity industries are 
expressly reserved for the Mexican state. Article 1101 establishes that “A party has the right 
to exclusively perform the economic activities set forth in Appendix III and refuse to 
authorize the establishment of investments in such activities.” Appendix III establishes 
those reservations:  
Section A. Activities Reserved for the Mexican State 
Mexico reserves the right to exclusively perform and to refuse to permit the 
establishment of investments in the following activities: 
1. Petroleum, Other Hydrocarbons and Basic Petrochemicals
(a) Description of activities
(i) Exploration and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas; refining or
processing of crude oil and natural gas; and production of artificial gas, 
basic petrochemicals and their feedstocks and pipelines; and 
(ii) Foreign trade; transportation, storage and distribution up to and
including first hand sales of the following goods: crude oil; natural and 
artificial gas; goods covered by Chapter Six (Energy and Basic 
Petrochemicals) obtained from the refining or processing of crude oil and 
natural gas; and basic petrochemicals. 
(b) Measures:
The Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico, Articles 25, 27, and 28 
Statutory Law of Constitutional Article 27 in the Petroleum Branch 
Law of PEMEX and Its Subsidiaries 
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2. Electricity
(a) Description of activities: the supply of electricity as a public service in
Mexico, including, the generation, transmission, transformation, distribution 
and sale of electricity. 
(b) Measures:
Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico, Articles 25, 27, and 28 
Electric Energy Public Utility Law 
In light of these rules, which have not been amended by Mexico, a relevant question is 
whether these reservations apply only to the right to restrict investment in these sectors or 
whether they are broader; i.e., whether they do not permit arbitration (within the scope of 
an investor versus state proceedings) of any dispute that arises in the energy sector. It must 
likewise be remembered that in the case of NAFTA, there is a special chapter regarding the 
energy and basic petrochemicals (Chapter VI), although the disciplines set forth therein 
only obligate the parties and do not grant any rights to investors; in the event of 
noncompliance with the rules, the general mechanism for the resolution of disputes set 
forth in Chapter XX would need to be applied. 
According to the theory of international law, reservations should be expressly stated and 
must clearly establish the areas where the obligations within a treaty are going to exclude 
or modify the obligation of compliance by either one of the parties.61 One possible 
interpretation is that the reservation only grants Mexico the right to restrict investments in 
energy matters, but not to prevent any investor from exercising rights in accordance with 
international investment treaties. 
By virtue of the fact that the reservations are still in effect—and, as far as we know, a 
reversal has not been requested by any of Mexico’s trade partners—both under NAFTA 
and the investment agreements concluded by Mexico, it should be determined whether 
Mexico was able at some time to claim inarbitrability ratione materiae by virtue of those 
reservations. For some authors and commentators, it may seem that arbitration would only 
be available in the event that the Mexican government waives the reservation or simply 
does not make use of the associated rights.62 However, cases like KBR’s demonstrate that 
the possibility of investment arbitration is real. The success or failure of the arguments of 
the claimant—particularly in light of the principles of investment protection, such as fair 
and equitable treatment—would still remain to be seen. The fact that the relevant energy 
sectors continue to be strategic areas within the constitutional text, along with the 
maintenance of administrative rescission under the Hydrocarbons Act and other laws, 
makes the substantive analysis of possible breaches of international law a very complex 
matter. Ultimately, it is not a minor issue to emphasize the fact that Clause 25.9 of the 
already quoted contractual model for the second bidding round of PEMEX’s “Round One” 
establishes that “the contractor shall benefit from the rights recognized under the 
international treaties to which the state is a party.”63 
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Conclusion
From a public policy perspective, the energy reform will implement far-reaching changes 
in the political, economic, and legal spheres in Mexico. Certainly, any process of opening to 
investment gives rise to the possibility of disputes that need to be settled within an 
environment of legal certainty. International arbitration in general, and investment 
arbitration in particular, are tools that serve both the investor and the state to properly 
resolve disputes that arise in the energy sector. 
Nonetheless, there are some issues that still remain unclear and that may cause a 
contractual dispute to become greater in scope and consequently have a major impact on 
investors, as well as on the state. The COMMISA case is an enlightening example in this 
context, particularly when analyzed in light of the subsequent claim of KBR, its parent 
company, based on Chapter XI of NAFTA. 
The elimination of the administrative rescission process from the PEMEX and CFE laws 
opens the door to arbitrations based on contractual disputes that can be carried out in a 
proper manner. However, the maintenance of this process—which originated in French 
administrative law—in the Hydrocarbons Act and other legislative bodies may result in 
arbitration clauses losing their meaning under specific circumstances, and claims for 
damages falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts.  
Finally, it does not appear that the reservations that Mexico maintains under its investment 
treaties are, in principle, an obstacle for investor versus state disputes to occur whenever a 
claim goes beyond breach of contract and involves arguments of perceived arbitrary or 
discriminatory treatment—or the denial of access to justice—as stipulated in the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. At the end of the day, a balance must be sought between the 
legitimate interests and expectations of an investor and the public policy interests of the 
state, particularly whenever a sector as significant as energy is concerned. 
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